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The Common Law in the American Legal System:
The Challenge of Conceptual Research*
Morris L. Cohen**
Professor Cohen discusses approaches to researching the subject of
the common law, noting the various usages of the term itself and
historical development of the common law in the United States. He
concludes that researching the topic requires study in a variety of
subject areG?, andprovides a bibliography ofsources.
The common law, in one or another of its usages, has always been
among the most popular topics of scholarly research in England and
America. In this country, it ranks with due process, equal protection,
judicial review, and constitutional interpretation as a major subject of
scholarly writing. The common law has been the focus of massive
commentaries and treatises throughout the legal history of England and its
former colonies, including the United States. In recent years, it continues
to be the subject of many monographs and symposia and hundreds of
articles.
Since the concept of the common law is multifaceted, encompassing a
variety of meanings, the literature that surrounds it reflects a wide range of
approaches and themes. So diverse is this literature that one is often
initially uncertain as to the thrust of a particular author's discussion of the
common law. Research on a legal concept with such a long and diverse
history similarly raises unique bibliographic problems.
My primary aim in this article is to suggest research strategies for
studying the various aspects of the common law, while briefly tracing
influences on the development of the common law in America. By initially
reviewing the various usages of the term, I hope to assist librarians,
bibliographers, and students to better understand the mass of writing on
the common law. This discussion of conceptual research on one topic may
also suggest approaches for similar research on other complex legal
concepts.
* © Morris L. Cohen, 1989. This article is based on a talk given at the American Association
of Law Libraries Institute on Legal Reference Services, Madison, Wisconsin, July 3,1987.
** Librarian and Professor of Law, Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut.
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When faced with a particular piece of writing on the common law, one
can ask a variety of questions to help clarify the author's approach. For
example, is the author dealing with the general jurisprudential notion of
the common law tradition? Or is the writer concerned with the historical
development of the common law? If so, what period does the author
discuss-the Romans, the medieval canonists, the period from the Norman
conquest, or some later starting point? Is the subject a comparative
analysis of the common law in various legal systems? If the work is limited
to the Anglo-American tradition, does it focus on the common law of the
commentators-Bracton, Coke, Blackstone, Kent, Story, and others-or
on the common law of the law reports themselves? Or, is the author
dealing rather with the process of the common law by which disputes are
resolved by precedent and judicial review? Does the writer reflect a natural
law approach, Langdell's view of law as a science, the views of the legal
realists, or the varied strands of the new critical legal studies movement?
To impose some order on the scholarship produced around this
variously defined term is not an easy task. It is surprising to discover how
the familiar words the common law have come to mean so many different
things and to be treated in so many different ways. The decision of where
to begin is itself a puzzle. Do we start with lexicography or history or
perhaps both? This effort will be a record of one librarian's search for
order in dealing with the challenge of conceptual research.
The Oxford English Dictionary seemed a reasonable starting point, as it
includes both lexicography and history. Omitting its examples of historical
usage, the O.E.D. offers the following under its entry for common law:
1. The general law of a community, as opposed to local or personal
customs, as of a caste, family, calling, city, or district. Obs. ...
b. Common law of the church: the general law of the Church, as
opposed to provincial constitutions, papal privileges, etc....
2. The unwritten law of England, administered by the King's
courts, which purports to be derived from ancient and universal usage,
and is embodied in the older commentaries and the reports of adjudged
cases.
In this sense opposed to statute law; also used for the law
administered by the King's ordinary judges as distinguished from the
equity administered by the Chancery and other courts of like
jurisdiction, and from other systems administered by special courts, as
ecclesiastical and admiralty law, and (in the Middle Ages) the law
merchant.
In U.S.: the body of English legal doctrine which is the foundation
of the law administered in all the States settled from England, and
those formed by later settlement or division from them.·
1. 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 692-93 (1893).
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Approaching other dictionaries, I started with the first editions of Dr.
Samuel Johnson and Noah Webster, more out of curiosity than with
serious expectations, and found the following in Dr. Johnson: "Common
law contains those customs and usages which have, by long prescription,
obtained in this nation the force of laws. It is distinguished from the statute
law, which owes its authority to acts of parliament."2 Noah Webster's
definition was more helpful:
Common Law, in Great Britain and the United States, the
unwritten law, the law that receives its binding force from immemorial
usage and universal reception, in distinction from the written or statute
law. That body of rules, principles and customs which have been
received from our ancestors, and by which courts have been governed
in their judicial decisions. The evidence of this law is to be found in the
reports of those decisions, and the records of the courts. Some of these
rules may have originated in edicts or statutes which are now lost, or in
the terms and conditions of particular grants or charters; but it is most
probable that many of them originated in judicial decisions founded on
natural justice and equity, or on local customs.3
Using Cowley's bibliography of legal abridgements and dictionaries4 as
a guide, I then reviewed more systematically the definitions in several
editions of John Rastell's An Exposition of Certaine Difficult and Obscure
Wordes and Termes of the Lawes of this Rea/me, from the first version
with substantial English translationS to the first American edition (1812).6
This survey included various editions of Cowell,7 BlountS and Jacob.9 It is
beyond the scope of this paper to quote all of these definitions and the
many treatments of the term which I examined in other sources. The
exercise was useful, however, and is recommended as an initial stage of
such conceptual research, though it need be used only selectively.
Reviewing dictionaries may show changes in the concept over the period of
time covered, although in this instance it revealed remarkable stability in
2. A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1755).
3. AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828).
4. J. COWLEY, A BmLIoGRAPHY OF ABRIDGMENT, DIGESTS, DICTIONARIES AND INDEXES OF
ENGLISH LAW TO THE YEAR 1800 (1932).
5. S.T.C. dates this as "[15261)," A. POLLARD & G. REDGRAVE, SHORT-liTLE CATALOGUE OF
BOOKS PRINTED IN ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, & IRELAND AND OF BoOKS PRINTED ABROAD, 1475-1640, at
20702 (1926), but Cowley describes it as "[after 1530)." J. COWLEY, supra note 4, at 20.
6. J. RAsTELL, LES TERMES DE LA LEY-OR, CERTAIN DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE WORDS AND
TERMS OF THE COMMON AND STATUTE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Now IN USE, EXPOUNDED AND EXPLAINED
(1812).
7. J. COWELL, THE INTERPRETER: OR, BOOKE CONTAINING THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS (1607),
and later editions.
8. T. BLOUNT, NOMo-LEXICON: A LAW DICTIONARY (l670), and later editions.
9. G. JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY (1729), and later editions.
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the definitions of common law and extensive borrowing among the
lexicographers.
Continuing the lexicographic approach into American legal dictionaries
did not produce any startling new insights. Bouvier showed extensive
change and expansion of his treatment between his first edition of 183910
and the latest version (called the third revision, eighth edition) by Francis
Rawle. l1 The Bouvier entry grew from less than one column in the first
edition to over eight columns of smaller type in the last revision. Beyond
the obvious Americanization of the definitions and some interesting leads
to treatises and judicial decisions in Rawle's revisions, this study offered
more on the development of American legal lexicography than on the
primary inquiry.
Black's Law Dictionary, Ballentine's Law Dictionary, and the many
new shorter law dictionaries added little to this search. Redden and Veron's
Modern Legal Glossary (1980), not as helpful as it usually is, gave an
interesting but rather rambling historical account of the term. 12 Bryan
Garner's Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (1987), on the other hand,
fulfilled its promise and offered a clear, concise and modern statement of
the four currently relevant definitions. In addition, Garner provided the
adjectival definition missing from most other dictionaries. 13
Moving from dictionaries to encyclopedias, I found both rewards and
disappointments. David Walker's Oxford Companion to Law (1980) set
out with clarity and thoroughness seven distinct meanings of the term and a
reference to the French and German usage of common law. In a relatively
brief treatment, he managed to .include both the historical development and
the comparative law dimensionY As usual, Walker was the best source for
a brief reference. With a few exceptions, the other encyclopedias consulted
were less satisfying.
The New Encyclopaedia Britannica gave a long historical account,
including Roman, civil, and comparative law aspects.JS Although quite
scholarly in tone, its coverage of modern periods (particularly the
American aspects) was so truncated, relative to the rest of the article, as to
be misleading in emphasis. The bibliography, while commendable in its
English historical references, was weak in the American sources it selected.
10. J. BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO TIlE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF TIlE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF TIlE SEVERAL STATES OF TIlE AMERICAN UNION (1839).
11. F. RAWLE, BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYLCOPEDIA (8th ed. 1914).
12. K. REDDEN & E. VERON, MODERN LEGAL GLOSSARY 98-99 (1980).
13. B. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 127 (1987).
14. D. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAw 253 (1980).
15. 4 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (MACROPAEDIA) 998-1005 (15th ed. 1974).
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On balance, the article was worth consulting, but by trying to appeal to too
many audiences, it served none very well.
Corpus Juris Secundum l6 and American Jurisprudence, 2cf17 were better
than I had suspected, but both were so diffuse and so anxious to cover all
bases that they lacked focus. Their useful insights, and they each had some,
tended to be submerged in masses of verbiage. The extensive footnote
citations to decisions, usually the main value of these case-finders, seemed
forbidding in a general article like this. Although some of the many state
court decisions cited may actually be useful, they seemed a doubtful avenue
to pursue. The author of the common law article in West's Guide to
American Law: Everyone's Legal Encyclopedia (1983-1985) produced an
unbalanced and rather disorganized piece.18
Both the Encyclopaedia oj the Social Sciences (1930-1935) and its
successor, the International Encyclopedia oj the Social Sciences (1968),
were more historical than socially scientific. The article in the original
version,19 by Roscoe Pound, reflected his personal biases, but was much
meatier than that in the successor set.20 Less well-known, Scribner's
Dictionary oj the History oj Ideas (1968) was surprisingly good in its
historical and comparative law approaches but didn't reach America (or
even nineteenth century England) until column eleven of its eleven-column
article.21
Most researchers, I suspect, would not have used the monumental
International Encyclopedia oj Comparative Law (1971-date) in such an
inquiry. It does in fact contain a useful survey of the common law system
in its section, "Legal Systems of the WorId! '22 Even more helpful were the
discussions of historical sources in the articles on the United Kingdom23
and the United States24 in its series, "National Reports." Those three
articles together provided the most informative treatment of the
encyclopedias.
From this preliminary study, I derived six separate definitions or
aspects of the common law-expandable to eight or compressable to four.
The six definitions I formulated are as follows.
16. 15A C.J.S. 40 (1967).
17. Perovich. Common Law. in 15A AM. JUR. 2D 593- 620 (1976).
18. McLaughlin. Common Law, in 3 THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 102-07 (1983).
19. 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 50 (1931).
20. 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 211-13 (1968).
21. 2 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 691-96 (1973).
22. 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 2. pt. 3 [1975].
23. 1 id. at U-69-U-74.
24. [d. at U-136-U-149.
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1. The general or central law of any community, as distinguished from
divergent local customs or other bodies of rules having a particular
source, or applied by a particular court, or applicable to a particular
group or area. Examples include the ius commune in Roman law; the
general law of the universal Church in Canon law, as distinguished
from provincial rules or customs, papal edicts, etc.; and, on the
European continent, the law which was common to the whole of a
state's jurisdiction, as distinguished from regional customs or
variations.
2. The centralized system of law developed in the courts of the English
kings by the royal justices from the 12th century on, as embodied in
the Yearbooks, the later reports, and the older commentaries.
3. The English law developed by the king's ordinary judges, as
distinguished from equity administered by Chancery and other courts
of equitable jurisdiction, and as distinguished from the specialized
bodies of law administered in ecclesiastical courts, admiralty courts,
and mercantile courts.
4. The whole law of England, including ecclesiastical, maritime and
mercantile law, as distinguished from the law of other countries,
particularly those using the civil law system based on Roman law.
5. The rights, powers, remedies and crimes derived from the decisions of
common law courts in England and America, as distinguished from
those originating in statutory law.
6. In America, the body of English legal doctrine which formed the
foundation of the law administered in those States settled from
England and in the later States formed by settlement or division from
the original States, and the later development of that law in America
down to modern times.
The next questions are how and where we can study the various aspects
of the common law in detail. Appended to this article is a selective
bibliography, which provides some leads to relevant sources in legal
history, philosophy, and the social sciences. This list is, of course, only
suggestive, and there are literally hundreds of other useful publications,
including treatises and histories devoted to particular subject areas of the
common law.
Our primary focus here, however, is the common law in the American
legal system, beginning with the settlement of the North American colonies
in the seventeenth century. First, we must deal with the commonly held
notion that the English settlers in America simply brought the common law
with them, and transplanted a homogeneous body of English law in
American soil. So described, the colonists' intellectual baggage consisted of
three B's: religion in the Bible, literature in Bunyan (Le., John Bunyan's
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Pilgrim's Progress) and the law in Blackstone (William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England). But, since the first volume of
Blackstone's Commentaries wasn't published until 1765, what were the
sources of the common law in America from 1620 to 1765? The story of
the diffusion of the common law to the New World is more complicated,
and so also is research into its sources.
The complexity stems from several, often overlooked, historical
conditions. For example, English law itself was quite unsettled in the
seventeenth century, when North America was first settled. Within a few
years of the English settlement of the Massachusetts Bay Colony,
Cromwell's Revolution, the establishment of the protectorate, and the
Commonwealth brought widespread disruption and many legal changes to
seventeenth century England.
Sir Edward Coke, in The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of
England, listed fifteen diverse sources of English law operating at the
beginning of the seventeenth century. These sources included the following:
1. The law of the Crown (lex coronae).
2. Parliamentary law and custom (lex et consuetudo Parliamentl).
3. The law of nature (lex naturae). .
4. The common law of England (Communis lex Angliae).
5. Statute law (laws established by authority of Parliament).
6. Customary law (consuetudines).
7. Law of arms, war and chivalry (jus belb).
8. Ecclesiastical or canon law.
9. Civil law in certain cases-not only in ecclesiastical courts but in the
courts of the constable and marshall, and of admiralty.
10. Forest law (lexforestae).
11. The law of marque and reprisal.
12. Merchant law (lex mercatoria).
13. Laws and customs of the Channel Islands.
14. The law and privileges of the Stannaries (mines).
15. The laws of the East, West and middle Marches.2S
The impact of that diversity was felt differently in the various
American colonies. In addition, some of the colonies had other non-
English and non-common law traditions, sources, and religious influences
which were merged into their reception of the common law. Later
influences from other legal systems and cultures affected the development
of a unique American law, both on the federal level and in some of the
states.
25. E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND lib. I, cap. 1, § 3
(1628).
•
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To add to this complexity, we must remember that the composition of
population and cultures changed constantly over the 350 years of American
history. The mixture of subgroups, affected by changing immigration
patterns, was quite different in the America of 1700, 1800, 1850, 1900, and
today. Finally, one must consider the impact of very different physical
environments, economic patterns, social attitudes, and religious views in
different times and places.
The varied sources of American law also have included Spanish
influences in Florida; the Spanish and the fossilized French tradition of
Louisiana; the Spanish remnants in Texas, California, and other states of
the American Southwest; native Hawaiian influences in Hawaii; and
Spanish sources of Puerto Rican law. And we often tend to overlook the
indigenous law of the various Native American groups in the areas that
they controlled.
Despite these often-overlooked variations in the legal traditions of the
American colonies, and later of the American states, the English common
law, or some parts of it, were the major influence in the early legal history
of this country. Every jurisdiction, except Connecticut, expressly received
the common law by charter, subsequent legislation, or constitutional
provision. Such reception was subject, of course, to the reservation that the
courts or the legi~lature could (and did) reject those parts of English law
inconsistent with the needs or conditions of that jurisdiction, or repugnant
to its views. The reception of the common law and the subsequent legal
development of the original colonies and of the subsequent states varied
considerably. For example, the different effective dates on which the
common law was received in each jurisdiction26 would, to some extent,
define what was being received.
The differing status of British statutes in the various American
colonies, and the statutes' differential treatment after independence by the
new states, varied the development of the common law among the statesY
Before independence, the colonists had sought (usually unsuccessfully) the
protection of the English common law and statutes. After independence,
they would selectively use only those statutes and parts of the common law
that suited their needs.28
To understand the importance of the reception statutes, we must
remember that the common law of England did not have automatic or
direct applicability or authority in the American colonies. Blackstone in his
26. For example, 1607 in- Virginia, 1662 in Maryland, 1712 in South Carolina, 1770 in Rhode
Island, 1775 in New York, and 1776 in Pennsylvania.
27. E. BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW, 1776-1836 (1964).
28. Id. at ix.
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Commentaries explains this by distinguishing between those colonies that
were uninhabited and uncultivated and were claimed by right of occupancy
only, and those that were already occupied and cultivated and were gained
by right of conquest or ceded by treaties. Blackstone then extended that
distinction with respect to the law applicable to each, as follows:
. . . if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by English
subjects, all the English laws then in being, which are the birthright of
every subject, are immediately there in force. . .. But in conquered or
ceded countries, that have already laws of their own, the king may
indeed alter and change those laws; but, till he does actually change
them, the antient laws of the country remain, unless such as are against
the law of God, as in the case of an infidel country. Our American
plantations are principally of this latter sort; being obtained in the last
century, either by right of conquest and driving out the natives (with
what natural justice I shall not at present enquire) or by treaties. And
therefore the common law of England, as such, has no allowance or
authority there. . ..29
Of course, many American jurists of the time disagreed with
Blackstone, whose views here, as elsewhere, were shaped by his
conservative political and legal attitudes. The general American view is
more accurately stated by 81. George Tucker, the Virginia jurist and law
teacher, in the appendix to his 1803 edition of Blackstone:
First . . . That the common law of England, and every statute of
that kingdom, made for the security of the life, liberty, or property of
the subject, before the settlement of the British colonies, respectively,
so far as the same were applicable to the nature of their situation and
circumstances, respectively, were brought over to America, by the first
settlers of the colonies, respectively; and remained in full force therein,
until repealed, altered, or amended by the legislative authority of the
colonies, respectively; or by the constitutional acts of the same, when
they became sovereign and independent states.
Secondly . . . That neither the common law of England, nor the
statutes of that kingdom, were, at any period antecedent to the
revolution, the general and uniform law of the land in the British
colonies, now constituting the United States.
Thirdly . . . That as the adoption or rejection of the common law
and statutes of England, or any part thereof, in one colony, could not
have any operation or effect in another colony, possessing a
constitutional legislature of it's [sic] own; so neither could the adoption
or rejection thereof by the constitutional, or legislative act of one
sovereign and independent state, have any operation or effect in
29. 1 \Y. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 107 (4th ed. 1770) (citations
omitted).
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another sovereign independent state; because every such state hath an
exclusive right to be governed by it's own laws only.
Fourthly ... Therefore the authority and obligation of the
common law and statutes of England, as such in the American states,
must depend solely upon the constitutional or legislative authority of
each state, respectively; as contained in their several bills of rights,
constitutions, and legislative declarations....
Fifthly. . . That neither the articles of confederation and perpetual
union, nor, the present constitution of the United States, ever did, or
do, authorize the federal government, or any department thereof, to
declare the common law or statutes of England, or of any other nation,
to be the law of the land in the United States, generally, as one nation;
nor to legislate upon, or exercise jurisdiction in, any case of municipal
law, not delegated to the United States by the constitution.3D
Tucker reflected the view of Section 34 of the federal Judiciary Act of
1789, which set forth the rules of decision in the new federal courts as
follows: " ... the laws of the several states, except where the constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rilles of decision in trials at common law in the courts
of the United States in cases where they apply. "31
Thus, there was no federal common law at the onset of our legal
history. The common law was received by the states and was to be applied
in the federal courts as altered, interpreted, or preserved by the state
courts. The Federal Constitution by implication imposed limitations on the
common law, primarily through the first ten amendments. Article VI,
which designates "the Constitution; and the laws made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made under the authority of the United States," to
be the supreme law of the land, did not, however, diminish the force of the
retained common law.
In 1842, the Supreme Court, in Swift v. Tyson32 interpreted Section 34
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to permit the federal courts to decide
questions of substantive law themselves, thereby sanctioning the creation of
a federal common law. Although Swift v. Tyson was widely and regularly
criticized, it remained the law of the land for almost a hundred years. In
1938, the Supreme Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins33 restored state law, as
defined and interpreted by the state courts (except as to procedural
matters), as the rule of decision in diversity cases in the federal courts.
30. Tucker, Appendix to 1 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TIIE LAWS OF ENOLAND 432-33
(S. Tucker ed. 1803).
31. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
32. 42 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
33. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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What are the main features of common law in America? Roscoe Pound
said on many occasions that the unique characteristics of the English
common law were the doctrines of precedent, the supremacy of law, and
trial by jury. American law has continued these three doctrines in general
terms, but with variation in form and content, in substance and procedure.
The pace and causes of deviation varied from period to period. The visceral
tie to the mother country, felt in the seventeenth century, gradually
weakened with the economic and political differences that developed
increasingly in the eighteenth century, and then more rapidly and
pervasively in the nineteenth century.
The abundance of land in this country rendered meaningless one of the
fundamental premises of the common law-that is, the scarcity of real
property in England. While the colonies accepted the general principles of
the common law, American practice was simpler, with less need for the
elaborate distinctions, fictions, and procedural complexities of English law.
Concern with personal rights, growing out of the religious dissent of many
of the early settlers and the varied grievances of the colonies against
oppressive English legislation and Royal despotism, led to new American
constitutional protections. Aversion to the practices and rules of equity and
the ecclesiastical courts, the English system of primogeniture, and the
proprietary privileges of landlords led to other changes. The American
deviations stemmed also from differences in the constitutional structures of
the colonies, in their political experiences and social attitudes, in local
traditions and social attitudes, and in local geography, resources, climate,
and economic conditions.
In the period following independence, the formative era of American
law, modification of the common law to meet American needs in a rapidly
expanding country was continued both by legislation and judicial
decision.34 The development of a domestic legal profession, an American
legal literature, and local sources of legal education were essential to the
new legal system, and each moved the received common law further from
its original roots. This was reflected in the literature of the law, seen in the
American editions of Blackstone,35 which added notes relevant to practices
in this country; in James Kent's Commentaries on American Law (1826-
1830); and in the remarkably prolific writings of Justice Joseph Story, who
produced original treatises on nine different subjects while serving both as
a Justice of the Supreme Court and as Professor of Law at Harvard. The
34. This process in Massachusetts has been described in W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE
COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975).
35. These editions can be traced in C. ELLER, THE WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COllECTION IN THE
YALE LAW LIBRARY: A BmLlOGRAPillCAL CATALOGUE (1938).
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extensive literature of legal treatises, which reached its peak in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is an invaluable source for the
study of the common law.36
The Ordinance of 1787 carried the basic law to what is now the
Midwest, and subsequent Congressional acts extended such coverage
further west and southwest. The Louisiana Purchase in 1803 added
extensive new territory, although the part that became the state of
Louisiana retained the legal system it had under Spanish, and then French,
rule. As Louisiana developed, the constitutional, public, and procedural
aspects of its law became Americanized, and the civil law influence was
largely limited to the private law areas of family law, real property, and
succession. Texas, California, and most of the Southwest, originally under
Mexican or Spanish rule, retained some of those influences. Here again,
the common law gradually intruded, so that, except for Mexican and
Spanish land grants and related land law in Texas, the community property
system is the major remainder of the old law in those states. The
Constitution of the Texas Republic in 1836 expressly provided for the
introduction of the common law, with some modification for local needs.37
Probably the most significant American innovation after the Constitu-
tion itself was the establishment of the doctrine of judicial review. In a
series of decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States, under Chief
Justice John Marshall, developed the power of the judiciary to decide on
the constitutionality of legislation. In 1803, the decision in Marbury v.
Madison38 held an act of Congress unconstitutional; in 1810, Fletcher v.
Pec/(>9 held a state law unconstitutional; Martin v. Hunter's Lesselt° in
1816 and Cohens v. VirginiaU in 1821 extended to the state courts the
power of judicial review of state legislation; and in 1824, the decision in
Qibbons v. Ogden42 upheld the authority of federal regulation of commerce
over competing state regulation by declaring a New York state law to be
incompatible with a federal act based on the commerce clause of the
Constitution.
Despite the later growth of statutory law in the nineteenth century, and
then of administrative law in the twentieth century, the vitality of
American common law development was assured by the role of the courts
36. See Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of
Legal Literature, 48 U. em. L. REv. 632 (1981).
37. TEX. CONST. OF 1836, art. IV, § 13.
38. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
39. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
40. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
41. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
42. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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as lawmakers. This creative role developed in three respects: first, judicial
review of the constitutionality of legislation; second, judicial interpretation
of the Constitution; and third, the continuing review and reformulation of
the common law. The extent to which the power to change the common
law by judicial reinterpretation was exercised has fluctuated through our
history, depending on the political climate, the pressure of social and
economic needs, and popular attitudes. Despite variations in the courts'
willingness to revise the common law, it is clear that in general the force of
precedent has been far less binding here than in England. Both the
widespread practice of distinguishing cases to avoid inconvenient
precedents and the power of the judiciary simply to change the law by
overruling prior decisions are now well established, although limited, of
course, by judicial sensitivity to the threat of legislative reaction and public
opinion.43 In any event, research in the common law must include the study
of judicial decisions, which remain its main repository.
A major countervailing development to the primacy of the common
law in America was the codification movement,44 which began as early as
1796 when Virginia adopted Jefferson's codification of the criminal law.
The agitation for codification was spurred by the spread of the Napoleonic
codes in Europe and by reformers who saw it as the best means for
rationalizing the law. It drew support both from the populist critics of the
legal profession and its "mystification" of the law, and from distinguished
jurists and scholars like Thomas Cooper, Zephaniah Swift, Albert Gallatin,
Edward Livingston and David Dudley Field.
Jeremy Bentham, the English advocate of law reform and codification,
had always considered the United States to be fertile ground for his
proposals. He wrote to President James Madison in 1811 offering to draft
a code of American law, without charge and in fact with an offer to pay
the printing costs himself. In his letter, Bentham set forth the following
scathing attack on the existing common law system in the United States:
"Every man's dearest and most important interests stand, or rather
fluctuate ... on some random decision or string of frequently
contradictory decisions, pronounced . . . almost without any intelligible
reason under the impulse of some private sinister interest.' '45 Bentham
characterized the common law as a "shapeless mass of merely conjectural
and essentially uncognizable matter," as "confused, indeterminate,
43. For a landmark discussion of changing attitudes, see Douglas, Stare Decisis, reprinted in 4
REC. A.B. ClTYN.Y. 152-79 (1949).
44. Described in detail in C. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT; A STUDY OF
ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981).
45. Quoted in id. at 98.
HeinOnline -- 81 Law Libr. J. 26 1989
26 Law Library Journal [Vol. 81:13
inadequate, ill-adapted, and inconsistent," and as "a species of mock
law."46 But the War of 1812 intervened; Madison did not reply until May
1816, and then offered no encouragement. In the meantime, Bentham tried
his proposals in Pennsylvania and New Hampshire, but again without
success. The conservative bar opposed codification virtually everywhere in
the country, and, with its frequent control of state legislatures, was usually
able to prevent such reform.
The movement for codification continued through the nineteenth
century, however, and gained some success first in Louisiana, where
Edward Livingston's code of procedure was adopted in 1805. Livingston's
other drafts of a criminal code, a civil code, a commercial code and a code
of evidence, among others, failed in the Louisiana legislature, as did his
proposal to Congress in 1828 for a complete, codified federal penal system.
David Dudley Field, who began working for codification in New York
in the 1830s, achieved more success. His code of civil procedure was
adopted in New York and became a model for so many other states that
code pleading replaced common law pleading throughout most of the
country. Fieldls penal code was not adopted in New York until 1887, but
Georgia adopted a civil code in 1860, and California had civil, political,
civil procedure, penal, and criminal procedure codes by 1872.
Much of the support for codification stemmed from dissatisfaction
with the uncertainty and inaccessibility of the common law, arising from
the multitude, diversity, and frequent inconsistency of judicial decisions.
Roscoe Pound argued that the great American legal treatises of the
nineteenth century, by providing practical access to the common law
through their synthesis of the mass of decisions, were instrumental in
defeating the codification movement. The West digest system provided
another access tool for this purpose in the first half of the twentieth
century.
The success of the American Law Institute's Restatements of the Law
and the uniform law movement in the middle of the twentieth century
represents a later stage and another approach in the effort for codification.
The popularity of the Restatements was certainly enhanced by the
increasing difficulty of access to the common law corpus through the West
digests. Whether computerized legal research in the form of LEXIS and
WESTLAW represents the latest salvation of the common law remains to
be seen. In any case, it seems clear that codification is again gaining ground
in the state legislatures, with the universal adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code but one symptom of the trend. Law librarians are aware
46. Quoted in id. at 75-76.
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that the common law and other legal sources depend for their survival on
effective access tools. Could the proliferation of regulatory legislation and
administrative law have been manageable in the last fifty years without the
development of the looseleaf services? The success of the common law has
always required effective access to the decisions and other legal sources on
which the system rests.
Continuing this review of the common law system in America, we next
see a jurisprudential challenge to the common law from the legal realists,
beginning in the 1920s. From 1870 to 1930, the increasingly conservative
American judiciary, opposing new legislation that sought to alleviate social
and economic problems, emphasized the sanctity of the common law and
of the English legal heritage. A group of American legal scholars were
influenced by a more pragmatic approach to law in France, Germany, and
Scandinavia, and by the writings of Justice Holmes. They developed a new
skepticism toward traditional common law attitudes and judicial
techniques. Led by Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn~ the realists stressed
law as a means to an end, not an end in itself. They focused on the ends
which the law should serve, and on the effectiveness of the legal system in
serving those needs. Their work included jurisprudential analysis, specific
empirical research, and extensive use of the social sciences. Emphasizing
law as part of the larger social context, they looked to the social sciences
for a better understanding of legal processes. A new literature, which
viewed law as a social science, developed rapidly and spread through the
law schools and the legal journals.47 This literature provides another source
for the study of the common law in America in this century.
The influence of the realists gradually affected the judiciary, and
moved the common law to deal more actively with the changing problems
of American life. The effect of this thinking on many sympathetic judges
increased pressures on the doctrine of precedent and led to a more flexible
judicial process. The common law survived, but as a more fluid and
socially sensitive legal system, with a fuller realization of its social impact
and the consequences of its decisions.
Following the realists (in time but not in philosophy), we now have the
well-publicized critical legal studies movement.48 The "Crits" attack the
47. A few representative works can be found in the appendix, infra, under "Law and the Social
Sciences." For proceedings of a 1936 conference reflecting this new view and opposition to it, see THE
FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAw (1937). L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986) and R.
SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982) describe the impact of the realists on
American legal education and legal theory.
48. The movement is described by one of its leaders in R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT (1986). Examples of the writings of the group can be found in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982) and in Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal
Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984).
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realists for their general acceptance of the common law system, as much as
they attack the premises and practice of the common law itself. Their
diverse views have not affected the judicial process and are not likely to in
the foreseeable future, but the writings of this group may influence other
scholars and may even affect the way common law research is conducted.49
Although this survey of American common law development has been
sketched in the most general terms, it should indicate that meaningful
research into the common law today requires study in a variety of subject
areas. A few suggested sources are listed in the footnotes and in the
appendix to this article. The growing interest in law and economics
indicates that such research is now being carried further into yet another
area of the social sciences-economics.so
Technological changes in the dissemination of legal information have
played an important role in the development of the common law, and will
undoubtedly continue to affect its direction in the future. The original
sources of the common law were written on parchment rolls, known as
"pipe rolls" and "plea rolls." These were succeeded by the manuscript
codex of gathered leaves, the physical form of the books we read today.
The invention of printing facilitated wider and faster dissemination of the
Yearbooks, which contained English law reporting from 1270 to 1535, and
other legal texts. Printing made possible the development of the common
law from its medieval origins to our present system.S1
In addition to the growing sophistication of the digests of decisions and
the recourse to codification in the nineteenth century, the next major
improvements in access took place at the end of the nineteenth and
beginning of the twentieth century. These included West's National
Reporter System and key number digests, the annotated reports of Lawyers
Co-op, annotated statutory compilations, Shepard's citators, and the
looseleaf services. That amazing series of bibliographic innovations has
provided access to the law from 1900 to the 1980s. The latest
developments, including micropublication, computer storage and retrieval,
optical discs, laser technology, and CD-ROM, constitute an even more
revolutionary series of changes. Their effect on the common law remains to
be seen, but some scholars are already speculating about the possible
49. See Barkan, Deconstructing Legal Research: A Law Librarian's Commentary on Critical
Legal Studies, 79 LAW LmR. J. 617 (1987).
50. See, e.g., papers presented at the Symposium on Change in the Common Law: Economic
and Legal Perspectives, reprinted in 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1980).
51. See generally Henderson, Legal Literature and the Impact of Printing on the English Legal
Profession, 68 LAW LmR. J. 288 (1975).
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impact of this technology on legal research and on the common law itself.52
American common law today is no longer a shared body of rules with
those of England, but rather a common way of thinking about law-more
a shared process for deciding cases and resolving disputes than a jointly
held body of substantive rules. Whetl1er viewed jurisprudentially Qr
bibliographically, Sir Edward Coke's famous dictum on the common law,
"out of old fields must spring and grow the new corn"53 has fresh meaning
for us today.
52. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 CALIF. L,
REv. 15,25-27 (1987).
53. Preface to 1 COKE'S REPORTS A6 (I727).
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